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Should the Present Method of Electing a President and Vice- 
President of the United States be Changed ? 


“Nothing can be imagined more dastardly than the disposition of those men who 
despair of their country. They make me think I see a graceless son, after sup¬ 
porting a little while the languid head of his sick mother, toss her back upon her 
bed and say, ‘ She will die, and why then should I give myself any trouble about 
her ?’” 

“Whenever opposition is'made to an apparently wise reformat'on let the people 
ook that corruption be not at the bottom.” 


SPEECH 


HON. LEYI MAISH, 

OF PENNSYLVANIA^ 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 


FEBRUARY 14, 1879. 











SPEECH 


OF 

HON. LEVI MAISH. 


The House being in Committee of the Whole for debate only — 

Mr. MAISH said: 

Mr. Speaker : As we stood upon the threshold of the second cen¬ 
tury of our Government’s existence we were confronted by a grave 
danger. We had passed through an election for President attended 
by unwonted party bitterness and high political excitement, and 
which left the title to that high office in dispute. All men recog¬ 
nized the fact that the great trial of our country had come, and the 
question whether free institutions on this continent should survive 
or perish had been brought to the awful test. 

As Webster said upon another occasion : 

All Europe was at that moment beholding us, and looking for the issue of the 
controversy ; those who hated free institutions with malignant hope—those who 
loved her, with deep anxiety and shivering fear. 

The malignant hope of her enemies was not met, and the hearts of 
her friends were gladdened, for we escaped the peril and our country 
was saved. It is madness to suppose that we can peaceably pass 
through another ordeal like it. If in 1880 an election be held under 
the old system and the same condition of things arise, as they proba¬ 
bly will, civil war in my judgment will inevitably follow. The ex¬ 
press will of the people cannot again be set aside. If it should appear 
that one or the other of the contending parties had elected their 
candidate they will not permit their choice to be defeated by partisan 
contrivances or fraudulent means. 

In the face of these conceded dangers, it was supposed that prompt 
action would be taken to guard by constitutional means the public 
safety. We have now nearly reached the period of another election 
and nothing has been done. From what does this apathy arise ? Are 
the evils that exist not duly appreciated, or has no satisfactory rem¬ 
edy been proposed ? Let us examine these questions. Amendments 
to our Constitution have never met with much favor. Innovations 
upon its provisions have always encountered resistance. When 
abuses grow up under it which are the fruits of its imperfections, 
wisdom dictates that an attempt shall be made at least to improve 
it. It would be madness to pause when the defects of the Consti¬ 
tution invite its own destruction. The great men who framed it well 
understood that occasions would come for its amendment; and, in 



4 


fact, in a very short time after its adoption it was found necessary to 
do so. Many of the men who signed that instrument participated in 
the work of improvement themselves. The method provided for its 
amendment constitutes a perfect safeguard against hasty and incon¬ 
siderate changes or alterations of our organic law. Two-thirds of 
both Houses, or conventions called upon the applications of two-thirds 
of the States, are necessary to propose amendments, and the ratifica¬ 
tion of three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States are nec¬ 
essary before an amendment can become a part of the Constitution. 

Various amendments have, in the history of our Government, been 
proposed in the forms provided and have been rejected by the Legis¬ 
latures of the States. Apprehensions, therefore, of this sort, it seems 
to me, are not well grounded. Blind conservatism is an enemy of 
progress and is itself a deplorable evil. The provision of the Consti¬ 
tution under which our Chief Executive is elected presents a singular 
history. 

The object which the framers of the Constitution had in view is 
radically different from the practice that has prevailed under it, and 
I have no hesitancy in saying that had its practical application 
been presented to the convention in a formulated proposition, it 
would not have received the support of the delegates of a single State. 
We have in this regard altered the Constitution without observing 
the forms for doing it. The provision of the Constitution prescribing 
the method for electing the President and Vice-President is found in 
article 2, section 1, and is as follows : 

Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, 
a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives 
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representa¬ 
tive, or person holding an office of trust or profit? under the United States, shall 
be appointed an elector. 

The intention of the framers of the Constitution was to commit 
the election of these high officers to a body of men distinct from and 
independent of the voters—or the Legislatures of the States. It had 
its origin in a distrust of the voters. Its purposes are explained by 
Alexander Hamilton in the following words. He says: - 

It is equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most 
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circum¬ 
stances favorable to deliberation and to a judicious combination of all the reasons 
and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of 
persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely 
to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investi¬ 
gation. 

How different is the theory of this provision of the Constitution 
from the practice of it. The electors were to cast their votes for the 
candidates for President and Vice-President without any instruction 
from the voters who selected them. It was supposed that it would 
not be safe to intrust the selection of these high officers to the voters. 
The electors, under the Constitution, were to elect a President with¬ 
out any previous instruction from any quarter. To their judgment, 
discretion, and intelligence alone was this trust confided. Now, in 
fact, the electors have become the useless agencies to ratify merely the 
express will of the voters. So thoroughly fixed and permanent has 
this custom now become that it would be nothing short of criminal 
for any elector to disregard the wishes of those who elected him. 

In this respect, therefore, it is seen that the purposes of those who 
framed the Constitution have in the practice of this provision been 
wholly defeated. For a while some of the States appointed the elect¬ 
ors by their Legislatures, in plain violation of the Constitution. This, 


however, became so unpopular that it was soou abandoned, ancl the 
only State that continued it for any length of time was tne State of 
South Carolina, which appointed its electors in that way up to the com¬ 
mencement of the rebellion. In other States the electors were ap¬ 
pointed by congressional districts. This was, in my judgment, the 
practice that was contemplated by the fathers, and if it had been ad¬ 
hered to many of the evils and abuses that have arisen under this 
provision of the Constitution would have been avoided. 

Ambitious men, stimulated by lust of power, soon discovered the 
advantage of a general-ticket system, by means of which they could 
throw the whole weight of the electoral votes of a State upon one 
side or the other of the scale. The political advantages that this 
would give to the politicians of a great State are apparent. The 
States that were disposed to adhere to the true system, namely, the 
election by congressional districts, were soon compelled to abandon 
that in self-defense. Thus one evil became the parent of another, 
and what was a mere fact one day was treated as a precedent the next. 
We are, therefore, now practicing a method for the election of the 
highest officers in our form of Government which has very little war¬ 
rant in the Constitution, were its letter and spirit strictly followed. 

Let us take a retrospective view of the elections as they occurred 
in our history. The original article upon this subject provided that 
electors should be appointed in such manner as the Legislatures of 
the respective States may direct; that they should meet in the respect¬ 
ive States and vote by ballot for two persons, and the person having a 
majority of the whole number of the votes cast by the electors should 
be the President, and the person receiving the next highest number of 
votes should be the Vice-President. By this mode George Washing¬ 
ton was twice elected and John Adams was once elected. Under this 
original provision occurred the memorable contest between Jefferson 
and Burr, and a person who had not received a single vote for Presi¬ 
dent, either through the electors or the people, was nearly elected 
President of the United States. 

In consequence of the violence thus attempted to be done to the 
popular will, the twelfth amendment to the Constitution was pro¬ 
posed and adopted. By it the electors are required to name in their 
ballots the persons voted for i;or President and the persons voted for 
for Vice-President, and to make a distinct list of the persons voted 
for and the number of votes cast for each, and to transmit the same 
to the President'of the Senate, who, in the presence of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives, shall “ open all the certificates and the 
votes shall then be counted, and the person having the greatest num¬ 
ber of votes for President shall be the President if such number be a, 
majority of the whole number of electors appointed.” 

This was doubtless an improvement upon the old plan, and I am sure 
was the means thus far of averting disaster. The prompt action of our 
statesmen in those days in remedying our Constitution is an example 
that should be followed now. We have given above substantially 
the Constitution respecting the election of President and Vice-Presi¬ 
dent as it now stands. Under it frequent difficulties have arisen and 
intrigues and corruption have been practiced that have brought re¬ 
proach upon our country. The popular will was on several occasions 
set at defiance and persons were put in the seat of Washington who 
could under no circumstances have received the indorsemHnt of the 
suffrages of the American people, showing that our mode of election 
is at variance with the spirit of free Government and as I believe 
subversive of the original intent of the framers of the Constitution. 


G 


We give below a table of the elections for President held since the 
year le&d. Anterior to that time no authentic or reliable popular 
vote can be obtained. A number of the Legislatures of the States of 
that time still continued to appoint the electors of the States, and of 
course iu such cases no popular vote was had, whilst in others where 
the people did participate in the election we have not been able to 
find any record. 


V 


1824 

1828 

1832 

1836 

1840 

1844 

1848 

1852 

1856 

1860 

1864 

1868 

1872 

1876 


Candidates. 


Andrew Jackson. 

John Quincy Adams.. 
William EL Crawford 

Ilenry Clay ... r . 

Andrew Jackson. 

John Quincy Adams . 

Andrew Jackson. 

Henry Clay. 


Political party. 


William Wirt. 

John Floyd. . 

Martin Van Buren. 

William Henry Harrison. 

Hugh L. White. 

Daniel Webster. 

Willie P. Mangum. 

William H. Harrison .. 

Martin Van Buren. 

James G-. Birney. 

James K. Polk .. 

Henry Clay. 

James G. Birney. 

Zachary Taylor. 

Lewis Cass. 

Martin Van Buren. 

Franklin Pierce. 

Winfield Scott. 

John P. Hale.. 

James Buchanan. 

John C. Fr6mont. 

Millard Fillmore.I Whig 

Abraham Lincoln .! Republican .. 


Democrat 
Federalist 
Caucus ... 
Whig .... 
Democrat. 
Federalist 
Democrat. 
National re¬ 
publican. 
Anti-Mason.. 
Anti-Jackson 
Democrat.... 

Whig. 

... do. 

...do . 

.. .do. 

. ..do. 

Democrat ... 
Abolitionist.. 
Democrat ... 

Whig. 

Abolitionist . 

Whig. 

Democrat.... 

Free-soil. 

Democrat 

Whig. 

Free-soil. 

Democrat 
Free-soil. 


Stephen A. Douglas 
John C. Breckinridge. 

John Bell . 

Abraham Lincoln_ 

George B. McClellan . 

Ulysses S. Grant. 

Horatio Seymour. 

Ulysses S. Grant. 

Horace Greeley. 

Rutherford B. Hayes. 
S. J. Tilden... 


Democrat 

do. 

Whig. 

Republican.. 
Democrat ... 
Republican.. 
Democrat... . 
Republican .. 

Liberal . 

Republican .. 
Democrat... . 


m 

f-i 

© 

© 

® 


© 


99 

84 

41 

37 

178 

83 

219 

49 

7 

11 

170 

73 

26 

14 

II 

234 

60 


170 

105 


163 

127 


254 

42 

'l74' 

114 

8 

180 

12 

72 

39 

212 

21 

214 

80 

286 

185 

184 


05 

© 

© 
© 
r — 1 

© 

© 

H 


® 

© 

> 

u 

<3 

P< 

© 

P8 


261 ’ 


261 


288 ’ 


294 ■; 


303 • 


152, 899 
105, 321 
47, 265 
47, 087 
650, 028 
512,158 
687, 502 
550, 189 


771, 968 

769, 350 

1, 274, 203 
1,128, 303 
7, 609 
1, 329, 023 
1, 231, 643 
66, 304 
1, 362, 242 
1, 223, 795 
291,878 
1, 585, 545 
1, 383, 537 
157, 296 
1, 838, 229 
1, 342, 864 
874, 625 
1, 866, 452 

1, 375, 057 
847, 953 
590, 631 

2, 223, 035 

1, 811, 754 

3, 016. 353 

2, 706, 637 

3, 597, 070 
2, 834, 079 

4, 023, 95D 
4, 284, 8&5 


Au analysis of this table will show very forcibly the defects of our 
present mode of elections. It demonstrates that the number of elect¬ 
oral votes has no just proportion to the number of popular votes 
cast. The first case in this table was the election in which General 
Jackson and John Quincy Adams were the opposing candidates. 






























































































r 

i 


General Jackson had 155,899 votes, against 105,321 votes cast for John 
Quincy Adams. There were other candidates, and Jackson did not 
have a majority over all. He had a majority over John Quincy 
Adams, his principal competitor, of 50,551, but he did not have a ma¬ 
jority of all the electoral votes cast, as required under the Constitu¬ 
tion, and the election was thrown into the House of Representatives, 
and John Quincy Adams, by the machinations of politicians, was 
elected in spite of the popular will. 

Colonel John H. Wheeler has made an interesting analysis of the 
various elections named in the table above, a part of which I give 
below: & 

The next election, (1828,) while the popular majority for Jackson was 137,870, in 
a total vote of 1,162,180, liis electoral majority was 95, in a total of 261; that is, 
the popular ratio was as 1 to 8; the electoral majority was as 1 to 2|, a ratio three 
times greater. 

In the next election (1832) this disparity appears still more glaring. "While 
Jackson’s popular majority was 137,313, in a'total vote of 1,237,691, or as 1 to 9, his 
electoral majority was 170, a ratio seven times greater. 

In the next election (1836) the popular majority for Van Buren was but 2,608, in 
a total vote of 1,541,318, while the electoral majority was 124, in a total vote of 
294; that is to say, the ratio of the majority of the popular vote was but as 1 to 
600, while the ratio of the electoral majority was less than 1 to 6, a ratio 100 as 
great. 

In the election of 1840 Harrison’s popular majority was 145,900, in a total poll of 
2,402,506, a ratio of 1 to 16, while his electoral majority was 174, in a vote of 294, 
or nearly ten times greater than the popular majority. 

In the next election (1844) Polk received but 31,000 majority, in a total of 2,626,950, 
or 1 in 900, while his electoral vote was 65 out of 275, or 1 to 4 ; 200 times the popu¬ 
lar vote. 

In 1848 General Taylor was in a minority of the popular vote; his vote being 
1,362,242, and Cass and Yan Buren had 1,515,173 ; and yet he received a majority of 
the electoral votes. 

In 1852 Pierce’s popular majority was 202.008, in a total vote of over 3,0C0,000, a 
ratio of 1 to 15, while his electoral majority was 192, out of 296 votes, a ratio ten 
times as great. 

In 1856 Mr. Buchanan was in a minority of the popular vote; he received 1,838,229, 
while the vote of Fremont and Fillmore was 2,216,789; and yet he received a ma¬ 
jority of the electoral votes.- 

In 1860 Mr. Lincoln was in a minority of nearly a million of popular votes. He 
received a total vote of 1,866,452, while the vote of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell 
combined was 2,813,741; and yet Mr. Lincoln received a majority of 123 in an elect¬ 
oral vote of 303. This election demonstrates in a most conclusive manner the fal¬ 
lacy of the electoral mode, and the possible misrepresentation under it of the pop¬ 
ular will. Lincoln received 180 votes, and Douglas only 12, out of 303 electoral 
votes. In the popular vote Lincoln received 1,866,452, while Douglas received 
1,375,157 votes. 

In 1864 Lincoln received 2,223,035 and McClellan received 1,811,754 of the popu¬ 
lar vote, while in the electoral college Lincoln received 212 votes, and McClellan 
received 21. A ratio of 22 to 18 in one case to 10 to 1 in the other. 

In the presidential election of 1868 General Grant received a popular majority 
of 309,716 in a total vote of 5,722,990. The ratio being about 10 to 9, while liis ma¬ 
jority of the electoral vote was 134 in a total vote of 294, the ratio being in that 
case as 13 to 5. 

In the election of 1872 General Grant received 3,597,070 votes, and Horace Greeley 
received 2,840,079 votes; Grant’s majority being only 727,975, and yet Grant received 
286 electoral votes, and his poor.opponent received none, while Charles O'Connor 
having but 29,408 of the popular vote received 42 of the electoral votes. 

But the last election held shows the monstrous outrage that can 
be perpetrated upon the popular will by the machinery supposed to 
be sanctioned by our mode'of election. Rutherford B. Hayes is rep¬ 
resented as receiving after the revision of the returning boards and 
the electoral commission 4,033,950 against 4,284,757 votes allowed to 
Samuel J. Tildeu, the democratic candidate, leaving Hayes in a mi¬ 
nority of 156,909. This showing is bad enough without taking into 
•consideration the action of the Louisiana and Florida returning boards. 


8 


It is here seen that a person w ho has not received a majority of the 
popular vote can still be made the President of the United States 
under the present electoral system. Even w T orse, it is shown that a 
person who has received a large minority of the popular vote may 
he elevated to the presidential chair. A system productive of so 
much injustice, fraud, intrigue, and corruption cannot be tolerated by 
the American people. Many attempts have been made in the past to 
change it. In 1823 Mr. McDuffie, the great and enlightened statesman 
of South Carolina, first proposed an amendment upon this subject. 
The prominent feature of the amendment proposed by him is con¬ 
tained in the following: 

For the purpose of choosing a President and Vice-President of the United States, 
each State shall be divided by the Legislature thereof into so many districts as 
the State shall be entitled to Representatives in Congress, and each district shall 
be composed of contiguous or coterminous territory, and contain, as nearly as may 
be conveniently, the number of persons for whom the State is entitled to a Repre¬ 
sentative according to the apportionment; which districts, when laid off, may not 
be altered until after another census shall be taken. 

The inhabitants of each of the said districts who shall have the qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature, shall 
appoint one elector of President and Vice-President having the same qualifications. 
The electors appointed shall meet in their respective States and appoint the other 
two electors to which the State is entitled, and also fill up vacancies, if such there 
shall be, from death, sickness, inability, or non-attendance of electors appointed by 
the people. The whole number of electors of each State shall then vote by ballot 
for the President and Vice-President, one of whom at least shall not be an inhabit¬ 
ant of the same State with themselves. 

The remainder of the amendment relates principally to the details 
of the proposed change. Mr. McDuffie, as chairman of the committee 
appointed for the purpose, accompanied this amendment by a learned 
and able report in which lie reviewed the evils of our present system. 
He also advocated its adoption in a masterly speech, from which I beg 
leave to quote a part: 

In bringing forward a proposition so fundamental in its character and calculated 
in my opinion to exert a lasting influence upon the happiness of future generations 
it is a source of sincere gratification to reflect that the measure does not rest upon 
the recommendation of an individual so humble and inexperienced as myself, but 
that its leading provisions (subject to some subordinate modifications which I hope 
will be adopted) are approved and sanctioned by many of the most profound and 
experienced statesmen of the country. 

This proposition has been for more than eight years before the nation; it was 
recommended by a majority of the States and a change has been anxiously desired 
by a large majority of the American people. When to the imposing weight of 
these circumstances wc add the consideration that, the great body of the people 
are at this moment deeply and justly excited upon the subject it must be apparent 
to every member of the committee that this proposition comes before us with a 
weight of authority which imperatively demands and will undoubtedly secure for 
it the most solemn and dispassionate consideration. 

It is seen that at the early period of 1823 this subject, had already 
excited very general interest. 

In 1823 Thomas H. Benton proposed in the Senate of the United 
States an amendment of the Constitution upon the same subject. It 
had for its objects, first, the division of the United States into elect¬ 
oral districts; second, the abolition of the use of intermediate elect¬ 
ors; and, third, the election of the President and Vice-President by 
the direct vote of the people. He delivered, in support of his amend¬ 
ment, an able and exhaustive speech upon that subject, in which he 
commented severely upon the abuses of our present system and spoke 
emphatically upon the evils of a general-ticket system. 

At a later period in our history several amendments to our Consti¬ 
tution were proposed on the same subject. General Jackson in all 
of his messages recommended the abolition of the system. 


0 


In 1872 Senator Morton offered a resolution in the Senate of tho 
United States instructing the Committee on Privileges and Elections 
of that body to examine and report upon the best and most practical 
mode of electing a President and Vice-President. In pursuance of 
that resolution an amendment was reported in 1874 in which the elec¬ 
tion of President and Vice-President is committed to a direct vote of 
the people upon the district plan similar to that proposed in 1823 by 
Mr. Benton. 

In 1875 Mr. Horace H. Harrison proposed a similar amendment in 
the House of Representatives and accompanied it by a learned and 
able report. Mr. H. Boardman Smith, the chairman of the committee 
that had charge of the examination of the subject, dissented from the 
report of the committee and submitted an amendment of his own, 
which, on account of its originality, I will in part give : 

Section 1. The President and Vice-President shall he elected by the direct vote 
of the people, but no voter in any State shall vote for candidates for President and 
Vice-President who are both citizens of the same State with himself. 

Sec. 2. In counting the votes, the aggregate popular vote in each State for Pres¬ 
ident and Vice-President shall be respectively divided by the number of the Rep¬ 
resentatives apportioned to such State in the House of Representatives and twice 
the result, the quotient shall be added to the vote of the candidate having the 
highest number of the popular votes in such State for President and Vice-President 
respectively as and for the State vote for such candidate. The person having the 
highest number of votes in all the States, including the popular vote and the State 
vote, for President, shall be President; and the person having the highest number 
of votes in all the States, including the popular vote and the State vote, for Vice- 
President, shall be Vice-President. 

The review I have given of the efforts made to reform the Consti¬ 
tution upon the subject of the elections for President and Vice-Presi¬ 
dent, shows that at no period were our statesmen insensible to the 
necessity for such reformation. It will strike every one as strange, 
however, that no considerable progress was at any time made toward 
the adoption of the numerous amendments proposed. An examina¬ 
tion of the amendments themselves will show the reasons why they 
have not succeeded. The amendments all proposed a radical change. 
No such alarming danger had arisen before the late election as to 
drive the statesmen of the country from their constitutional inertness. 

Furthermore, it was supposed, that all of them were an infringe¬ 
ment on the rights of the States. This was not true in point of fact; 
yet the apprehension that their adoption would lead to a centraliza¬ 
tion of power in the General Government had much to do with their 
failure. It is therefore necessary in providing a remedy for existing 
evils not only to examine the evils themselves, but also to take into 
consideration what might be acceptable to the States, and especially 
the smaller States, which are so jealous of the unequal influence the 
present system gives them. 

Any proposition that would strike down the advantages they have 
as represented by their senatorial-electoral votes will incur their oppo¬ 
sition, and therefore fail. A plan to succeed, therefore, must preserve 
as nearly as possible the autonomy of the States. Hon. Charles R. 
Buckalew, late a Senator from Pennsylvania, and one of the most 
philosophical political thinkers that this country has produced, pro¬ 
posed a plan which is free from all the objections suggested, and yet, 
as I believe, proposes a thorough remedy for the existing evils. 

Soon after the last presidential election, in February, 1877,1 intro¬ 
duced his plan in Congress. I give the bill in extenso: 

Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 

of America. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Amer¬ 
ica in Congress assembled , (two-thirds of each House concurring therein,) That the 


10 


'following amendment to the Constitution of the United States be proposed to the 
Legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of said 
Legislatures, shall become and be a part of the Constitution, namely: 

Article *XVI. 

Article 2, section 1, paragraph 2, to be made to read as follows: 

“Each State shall be entitled to a number of electoral votes equal to the whole 
number of Senators and Representatives to which the State shall be entitled in 
Congress.” 

The first division of the twelfth amendment to the Constitution, ending with the 
words “directed to the President of the Senate,” to be struck out, and the follow¬ 
ing substituted: 

“ The citizens of each State who shall be qualified to vote for Representatives in 
Congress shall cast their votes for candidates for President and Vice-President by 
ballot, and proper returns of the votes so cast shall be made under seal, within ten 
days, to the secretary of state or other officer lawfully performing the duties of 
such secretary in the'government of the State, by whom the said returns shall be 
publicly opened in the presence of the chief executive magistrate of the State, and 
of the chief justice or judge of the highest court thereof; and the said secretary, 
chief magistrate, and judge shall assign to each candidate voted for by a sufficient 
number of citizens a proportionate part of the electoral votes to which the State 
shall be entitled, in manner following, that is to say: they shall/livide the whole 
number of votes returned by the whole number of the State’s electoral vote, and 
the resulting quotient' shall be the electoral ratio for the State, and shall assign to 
candidates voted for one electoral vote for each ratio of popular votes received by 
them respectively, and, if necessary, additional electoral votes for successive largest 
fractions of a ratio shall be assigned to candidates voted for until the whole num¬ 
ber of the electoral votes of the State shall be distributed ; and the said officers 
shall thereupon make up and certify at least three general returns, comprising the 
popular vote by counties, parishes, or other principal divisions of the State, and 
their apportionment of electoral votes as aforesaid, and shall transmit two thereof, 
under seal, to the seat of Government of the United States, one directed to the 
President of the Senate and one to-the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
and a third unsealed return shall be forthwith filed by the said secretary in his 
office, be recorded therein, and be at all times open to inspection.” 

Article 2, section 1, paragraph 4, to be made to read as follows : 

“ The Congress may determine the time of voting for President'and Vice-Presi¬ 
dent and the time of assigning electoral votes to candidates voted for, which times 
shall be uniform throughout the United States.” 

Strike out the words “electors appointed,” where they occur in the twelfth 
amendment to the Constitution, and insert in their stead the words “ electoral 
votes.” 

I again introduced it in October, 1877, at a subsequent session of 
Congress. This amendment was referred to a special committee of 
the House “on the state of the law respecting the ascertainment and 
declaration of the result of the election for President and Vice-Presi¬ 
dent.” This committee proposed an amendment in which they advo¬ 
cated the vital principle of the amendment of Mr. Buckalew. 

In a contribution to the North American Review for March and 
April, 1877, Mr. Buckalew explains his amendment. It is but just, 
since he is the author of the plan, that his opinion of it should be 
presented, especially.so since he does it in a more able manner than I 
can hope to do myself. I read from pages 170 to 174, both inclusive: 

The resolution for constitutional amendment introduced in the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives, February 7, by Mr. Maish, of Pennsylvania, presents a proposition 
worthy of deliberate examination. It is in some material respects new, but is 
simple in its terms, strikes an effectual blow at known forms of electoral abuse, 
and is plainly founded in principles of justice. The amendment may be conven¬ 
iently described under three heads of remark : First, it provides for a direct vote 
by the people for President and Vice-President; second, it retains electoral votes 
as at present, while dispensing with electors and electoral colleges ; and, third, it 
assigns to candidates electoral votes from each State in proportion to popular votes 
received by them therein. This last feature of the plan ispeculiar to it, and, taken 
with the others, presents a complete scheme of constitutional amendment. 

A direct popular vote for President and Vice-President is highly desirable, if it 
can be secured without encountering objections which will outweigh its advan¬ 
tages : and therefore most plans of radical amendment relating to presidential elec¬ 
tions will comprise or involve it. But the popular-majority principle, whether ap- 


11 


"plied to the whole country without distinction of States or applied to the vote of 
each State, is open to grave objections. In the former case it converts the whole 
body of American electors into a consolidated democracy, gives unchecked effect 
upon the general result to all disturbing and sinister influences which assail elec¬ 
tions, and opens afield of inquiry in cases of contest or dispute which cannot be 
well or safely entered upon by a court or by Congress. In the latter case the plan 
must be combined with some scheme of State representation or proportional vote, 
which brings in or retains the idea of State electors or electoral votes, and assigns 
unjust, because inordinate, weight to State majorities ; besides, within each State 
it plainly invites to corruption and all forms of undue influence. Nor do we avoid 
these objections if we modify the plan and provide for taking the popular vote by 
districts or subdivisions of States, the majority in each to count as one or more 
electoral or State votes. 

A local fraud under such modified plan may expend its force in a single district, 
instead of contaminating the whole State return ; and the general party majority 
in the State may not, and commonly will not, carry majorities in all the districts, 
and thus absorb all the power of the State in the election. In these respects, how¬ 
ever, this modified plan affords but a partial remedy, while it calls into existence 
an evil and a scandal of the first magnitude—one fortunately unknown hitherto in 
presidential elections—we mean the gerrymandering of States in the formation of 
electoral districts. The competition in inj ustice and outrage between parties which 
the plan would inevitably produce would soon become intolerable. But the Maish 
amendment, as will be presently seen, is quite free from these imperfections, while 
it completely accepts and applies the direct-popular-vote principle. It is, there¬ 
fore, to be preferred to other plans which, aiming at the same object, can accom¬ 
plish that object only in disregard of great and permanent objections. 

In the next place, the amendment dispensing with electors retains to the States 
electoral votes as at present; that is, to each a number equal to the number of Sen¬ 
ators and Representatives from the State in Congress; and this is perhaps a neces¬ 
sary provision in any proposition of change; for, as was explained by an accom¬ 
plished writer in the last number of the Review, it is not to be expected that the 
smaller States, including more than one-half of the whole number, will surrender 
that portion of their power in presidential elections which is now represented by 
senatorial electors. Such surrender would involve a loss of relative power by each 
of no less than twenty-one States, ranging from one-fourth to two-thirds of their 
present voting power. It follows that Congress will not pass by a two-third vote 
of each House, nor three-fourths of the States accept, an amendment which will 
dispense with State electoral votes. 

By the proportional distribution of electoral votes, based strictly upon the popu¬ 
lar vote of each State, several objects of the highest importance will be secured: 

1. It will very greatly I’educe, in fact, almost extinguish, the chances of a disputed 
election, by causing the electoral vote of the State to be very nearly a reflex of the 
popular vote by confining the effect of fraud and other sinister influences within 
narrow limits and by withdrawing the compact, undivided power of any one State 
from the contest. Giving a just allotment of electoral votes to candidates, not 
greatly too many or too few, it conforms to the popular sense of justice and tends 
to allay passion and prevent controversy. It excludes the temptation to falsify or 
manipulate election returns, by which the whole vote of the State may be wielded 
in the interest of a party. Under it there would be no rival electoral colleges or 
double returns of electoral votes, and pivotal States, inviting to profuse money ex¬ 
penditure, to fraud, and to false returns, would no longer be known as a conspicu¬ 
ous feature of presidential contests. 

“2. It will render almost impossible the election of a minority candidate in a con¬ 
test between two, and will in many cases prevent a plurality candidate from re¬ 
ceiving an unjust electoral vote, and often from being improperly returned to the 
House of Representatives as one of the three persons from whom the choice is to 
be made, in cases where the power of choice shall devolve upon that House. It 
will secure justice by insuring fair representation of the people and applying the 
majority rule to the electoral instead of the popular vote; in other words, all the 
people will be represented by electoral votes, aud the majority principle will be 
properly applied when the general returns of those electoral votes shall be sub¬ 
jected to computation. Popular disfranchisement within a State will be swept 
away, while tbo supporters of no candidate will control more than their due share 
of electoral power. 

3. It will very greatly discourage and prevent unfairness and fraud in elections 
by excluding the motives which produce them. In this respect its superiority to 
other plans of amendment is conspicuous and unquestionable. Assuming a ratio 
of thirty thousand for an electoral vote, a fraudulent vote of ten thousand would 
mean one-third of one electoral vote-in other words, would mean nothing as to 
results—instead of meaning, as it now does in many cases, the balance of power in 
• a State, and the control of its whole electoral vote. In a State like Aew Ybrk or 


12 


Pennsylvania a fradulent vote of even thirty thousand or forty thousand would? 
aiieet but one electoral vote out of thirty or forty cast by the State, instead of trans¬ 
ferring all those thirty or forty votes from one candidate to another. Speaking 
within bounds, the effect of any common fraud in presidential elections would be¬ 
come inappreciable, and the motive for committing such fraud would be wholly 
removed. Could there be a more complete device for purifying arid improving elec¬ 
tions than this, or one more imperatively demanded by the necessities of the times V 
District voting for electors would not extirpate this evil of corrupt elections, foz 
the balance-of-power vote in each district would be the object of money expendi¬ 
ture and evil influence, as we already have them in congressional districts. Tens 
thousand foul votes in a State might control half a dozen or more districts, while* 
they would be entirely' lost when counted in the aggregate or total vote of the* 
State. 

One of the most pernicious effects of the present system is the great 
inducement it offers for the perpetration of fraud. Under the pro¬ 
posed amendment the inducement would be almost entirely removed. 
The operations of a Louisiana returning board could not, in its most 
reckless disregard of the votes of the people, affect a single electoral 
vote. In the pivotal States, where the fictitious majority of a few thou¬ 
sand votes controls the entire electoral vote of the States, what frauds 
are not resorted to! An administration struggling for the perpetua¬ 
tion of its power through the influence of its patronage and unmiti¬ 
gated use of money makes States like these the scene of corruption 
horrible to contemplate and dangerous to the existence of the Repub¬ 
lic. Under the plan we propose “the game would not be worth the 
candle,” for in most cases the ratio would be greater than all the votes 
that could be manufactured by all the corrupt means that could be 
brought into requisition. It would achieve a consummation devoutly 
to be wished for—a peaceable, orderly, and honest election for Presi¬ 
dent and Vice-President of the United States. 

The artificial influences of the elections held in October in tho 
States of Ohio and Indiana would be completely destroyed, for the 
results in those States then would give no indication or suggest any 
intimation what the result of the presidential election would be in 
the Union. 

I have yet better reasons to advance in favor of this amendment, 
which I trust will not be disregarded. The baue of our politics in 
the past and the present is sectionalism. Its effects in the past his¬ 
tory of the country need not be told. It was hoped by many that 
we could after the war enter upon a career of fraternal feeling and 
mutual good understanding: that no sectioual issues w r ould arise; 
that party lines would not be drawn between the different sections 
of our country. But it must be a matter of serious concern to all 
who are interested in the future tranquillity and prosperity of our 
country to hear such tfordsasa “solid South” and a “united North.** 
A distinguished writer once said that “Ideas govern the world or 
throw r it into chaos.” 

Unreasonable as may be the cant of the politician, we know from 
bitter experience that party lines drawn upon issues like these en¬ 
gender sectional hate and, as I believe, w ill, as heretofore, lead to a 
dissolution of the Union or revolution. We all realize its tendencies. 
Consolidation of interests in one section begets a countervailing con¬ 
solidation of interests in another, and thus section is arrayed in 
deadly hostility against section. The election of President and Vice- 
President as we now have it is, as it always has been, the chief source 
of this trouble. 

'When the time comes in our presidential elections,as it inevitably 
will under the proposed plan, that a republican candidate for Presi¬ 
dent will receive a portion of the electoral vote of the State of 


13 


Georgia and a democratic candidate for the same office will receive a 
portion of the vote of Massachusetts, sectionalism will disappear from 
our politics, fraternal feeling will spring up between the sections, 
and the President so elected by votes from all sections of the country 
will feel that he is the President of the whole undivided country. 

I pause here to notice an objection that has been made to the plan 
suggested. It has been urged as an objection to this plan that it in¬ 
terferes with the rights of the States. Mr. Southard, of Ohio, in a 
speech delivered by him on the 14t.h of February last, has ably met 
these objections. The plan we advocate was ably presented in a re¬ 
port of the committee heretofore mentioned of which Mr. Southard 
was chairman. The minority of that committee did not concur with 
the views of the majority, and among the objections then urged in a 
report they presented are found the following : 

The proposed plan takes away from the political bodies the right to speak, each 
for all its people, and permits minorities to speak to the whole United States, to 
have their voice heard here in the aggregate result; to become in effect voters 
of the United States instead of voters of the States. The right to speak by a ma¬ 
jority when its fundamental laws permit, is a right inherent in every republic. 
This plan takes away from these republics (the States) this right to speak by their 
majorities, and confers upon the United States the right to say by a majority of 
the whole who shall be President and Vice-President. Why should the right of a 
majority in a State not be as sacred as the right of the majority of the whole United 
States; why rob the States of this right and confer it upon the General Govern¬ 
ment? Is it not too clear that this is simply another step toward consolidating the 
States out of sight in our system ? 

This objection is founded upon the idea, as will be seen, that the 
Constitution provides for the election of the President by the gen¬ 
eral-ticket system. This position is wholly untenable. It can be suc¬ 
cessfully shown that the framers of the Constitution contemplated 
no such election. Mr. McDuffie, in a speech I have already quoted 
from, answers that question, and I give here what he says upon that 
subject: 

I have already shown, from the highest authority, that the convention intended 
that the electors of the President should be chosen by the “ immediate act of the 
people of America.” I will now attempt to show that it was equally intended that 
the people should vote by districts. I believe I may safely assert that at the time 
the Constitution was framed the general-ticket system, by which the whole popu¬ 
lation of a State gives an aggregate vote, either for Representatives or other public 
agents, was unknown in the political history of the world. I call upon gentlemen, 
if any such example existed, to produce it.' It is an invention of aftertimes, the 
mere'offspring of temporary expediency, and never entered into the conception of 
the convention. By adverting to the proceedings of that body it will be seen that 
all the propositions involving a specification of the mode of choosing electors and 
members of Congress contained a provision for dividing the States into districts. 
The mode of choosing was finally left to the State Legislatures, that they might 
regulate the details of the election, but in the confidence that they would adopt the 
only plan of popular election which had ever existed. 

Mr. Benton, in commenting upon this feature of our presidential 
elections in his speech in the Senate of the United States in 1824, 
made the following forcible remarks: 

The general-ticket system now existing in the States was the offspring of policy, 
and not of any disposition to give fair play to the will of the people. It was 
adopted by the leading men of those States to enable them to consolidate the vote 
■of the State. It would be easy to prove this by referring to facts of historical no¬ 
toriety. 

If it be true, and that it is it seems to me there can be no doubt, 
that a district system was the one that our fathers had in view, then 
no invasion of the rights of the States will follow by the adoption of 
the proposed amendment, for it does not in any way affect the status 
of the States that would not also be so affected by the district system. 


14 


Their argument shows that the departure from the original intention* 
of the framers of the Constitution has resulted in the acquisition of 
power by the States which the Constitution does not warrant, and 
the amendment will result only in a restoration of those powers which 
were originally granted. The election of President and Vice-Presi¬ 
dent contains no surrender of power by the States. It is an arrange¬ 
ment between the States made by the terms of the Constitution, and 
when the States entered into the arrangement each impliedly agreed 
1..' that they would perform their part of the agreement honestly and 
faithfully. The practice that has grown up is a violation of the let¬ 
ter and of the spirit of that agreement. 

It might be interesting to show what effect the proposed plan would 
have had on the last presidential election. The tablegiving the num¬ 
ber of electoral votes each of the prominent candidates received 
shows that Mr. Tilden received a majority of eleven, irreversible by- 
intrigue, fraud, or corruption. I present this table here to establish 
this important fact: 


States. 

Tilden. 

Hayes. 

States. 

Tilden. 

Hayes. 

Maine.... 

3 

4 

Texas. 

6 

2 

X pw TTa/mpshire _ 

2 

3 

Arkansas . 

4 

2 

V ermont. 

2 

3 

Missouri... 

9 

6 

Massachusetts . 

5 

8 

Tennessee. 

7 

5 

Bhode Island . 

2 

2 

Kentucky ............ 

7 

5 

C! firm fir.t i cn t 

3 

3 

Ohio. 

11 

11 

Xew York . 

18 

17 

Indiana__ 

8 

7 

X pw .Torspy 

5 

4 

Illinois .. 

10 

11 

TPennsylvania, 

14 

15 

Michigan. 

5 

6 

Delaware 

2 

1 

Wisconsin ... 

5 

5 

Maryland rT 

4 

4 

Towa, _ _ 

4 

7 

Virginia. 

7 

4 

Minnesota. 

2 

3 

West Virginia. 

3 

2 

Kansas. 

2 

3 

North Carolina 

5 

5 

Nebraska ____ 

1 

2 

South Carolina. 

3 

4 

Nevada ... 

1 

2 

Georgia. 

8 

3 

Colorado .. 

1 

2 

Florida. 

2 

2 

Oregon ... 

1 

2 

Alabama 

6 

4 

California,__ 

3 

3 

Mississippi 

5 

3 




Louisiana . 

4 

4 

Total. 

190 

179 








That gives Mr. Tilden the eleven majority to which, according to 
the popular vote in each State, he is entitled. 

A similar application of this plan to all the elections held in this 
country will show, first, that the will of the people would in all cases 
have been observed; secondly, that the usual concomitants of in¬ 
trigue, fraud, and corruption would have been futile to defeat that 
will. 

The district system, which has been strongly advocated, though I 
recognize it as an improvement on our present system, is yet liable 
to many objections from which the proposed plan is free. Close dis¬ 
tricts would offer to a limited extent the same inducement for fraud 
and corruption that the pivotal States now do. Many districts in 
the country would be nearly equally divided. These would invite all 
the political machinations that are usually resorted to to carry elec¬ 
tions, notably such as the importation of voters and the gerrymand¬ 
ering of the States, thus depriving us of the benefits which we confi¬ 
dently hope will result from the amendment. 

This amendment is presented in the conviction that it will produce 




















































15 


all the benefits that are claimed for it. We maintain that it will 
produce the following results : 

1. It will render practically impossible the election of a minority 
President. 

2. It will insure a just and equitable expression to the popular will. 

3. It will almost entirely extinguish the chances of a disputed elec¬ 
tion. 

4. It will remove the principal inducements for the perpetration of 
intrigue, corruption, and fraud, by rendering abortive all such at¬ 
tempts. 

5. It abolishes the presidential electors, a useless, cumbersome, and 
dangerous agency in our mode of election. 

Lastly, it destroys sectional issues, so dangerous to the peace, har¬ 
mony, and safety of the country. 

Are these not objects that should excite the interest and active 
support of our legislators? We fervently hope that this important 
question may receive the prompt and zealous attention of our future 
legislators, here and in the States. 


O 


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